CSCI 262 Computer Security

Fall 2013
Lecture 1
Halim M. Khelalfa

(main reference = Dieter Gollmann, Computer Security, John Wiley, 3rd edition, 2011)

By PresenterMedia.com
Lecture 1
Part I:
History of Computer Security
•Learning outcomes of part 1

1. Outline of the history of computer security

2. Explain the context in which familiar security mechanisms
were originally developed
3. Show how changes in the application of IT pose new
challenges in computer security
4. Discuss the impact of disruptive technologies on computer
security
•Introduction
1. Security is a journey, not a destination.
2. Computer security has been travelling for forty
years.
3. The challenges faced have kept changing.
4. So have the answers to familiar challenges.
5. Security mechanisms must be seen in the context of
the IT landscape they were developed for.
•Epochs
• 1930s: people as “computers”
• 1940s: first electronic computers
• 1950s: start of an industry
• 1960s: software comes into its own
• 1970s: age of the mainframe
• 1980s: age of the PC
• 1990s: age of the Internet
• 2000s: age of the Web
Starting Point: Anderson Report, 1972
• In recent years the Air Force has become increasingly aware of
the problem of computer security. This problem has intruded
on virtually any aspect of USAF operations and administration.
The problem arises from a combination of factors that includes:
Starting Point: Anderson Report, 1972
• The problem arises from a combination of factors that includes:
1. Greater reliance on the computer as a data processing
and decision making tool in sensitive functional areas;
2. The need to realize economies by consolidating ADP
resources thereby integrating or co-locating previously
separate data processing operations;
3. The emergence of complex resource sharing computer
systems providing users with capabilities for sharing
data and processes with other users;
4. The extension of resource sharing concepts to
networks of computers; and the slowly growing
recognition of security inadequacies of currently
available computer systems
 •1970s: Mainframes – Data Crunchers
• Technology: Winchester disk (IBM) 35-70 megabytes memory.
• Application: data crunching in large organisations and government
departments.
• Protection of classified data in the defence sector dominates
security research and development.
• Social security applications and the like.
• Security controls in the system core: operating systems, database
management systems
• Computers and computer security managed by professionals.
•1970s: Security Issues
• Military applications:
• Anderson report
• Multi-level security (MLS)
• Bell LaPadula model
• Status today: High assurance systems developed (e.g. Multics)
but do not address today’s issues.
• Non-classified but sensitive applications
• DES, public research on cryptography
• Privacy legislation
• Statistical database security
• Status today: cryptography is a mature field, statistical database
security reappearing in data mining.
• Fundamentals of access controls
•1980s: PCs – Office Workers

• Technology: Personal Computer, GUI, mouse, …

• Application: word processors, spreadsheets, i.e. office work.
• Liberation from control by the IT department.
• Single-user machines processing unclassified data: No need
for multi-user security or for MLS.
• Risk analysis: no need for computer security.
• Security evaluation: Orange Book (TCSEC, 1983/85): Driven
by the defence applications of the 1970s.
•1980s: Security Issues
• Research on MLS systems still going strong; Orange Book, MLS
for relational databases.
• Clark-Wilson model: first appearance of “commercial security”
in mainstream security research.
• Worms and viruses: research proposals, before appearing in
the wild.
• Also the worm comes from Xerox park (1982) …

• Intel 80386 drops support for segmentation. (Microsoft DOS

did not use it)
•1990s: Internet – Surfers Paradise?

• Technology: Internet, commercially used.

• Applications: World Wide Web (static content), email,
entertainment (music, movies), …
• Single-user machine that had lost its defences in the
previous decade is now exposed to the “hostile” Internet.
• No control on who can send what to a machine on the
Internet.
•1990s: Internet – Surfers Paradise?

• Technology: Internet, commercially used, Web 1.0.

• Applications: Web surfing, email, entertainment, …
• Single-user machine that had lost its defences in the
previous decade now exposed to “hostile” Internet.
• No control on who can send what to a machine on the
Internet.
• Buffer overrun attacks:
• Aleph One (1996): Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit
• “Add-on” security controls: firewalls, SSL, browser sandbox
as reference monitor, …
•1990s: Security Issues

• Crypto wars: is wide-spread use of strong cryptography a good idea?

• Internet security treated as a communications security problem.
• Buffer overrun attacks:
• Aleph One: Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit
• Internet security is mainly an end systems issue!
• Java security model: the sandbox. New access Control paradigms
• Trusted Computing; Digital Right Management (DRM)
• Status today: mature security protocols (IPsec, SSL/TLS), better
software security.
•2000s: Web – e-Commerce
• Technology: Web services, WLAN, PKI??
• Web 2.0: dynamic content
• B2C applications: Amazon, eBay, airlines, on-line shops, Google,
...
• Criminal activity replaces “hackers”.
• Legislation to encourage use of electronic signatures.
• PKIs have not taken off; e-commerce has essentially evolved
without them.
•2000s: Security Issues

• SSL/TLS for secure sessions.

• Software security: the problems are shifting from the
operating systems to the applications (SQL injection, cross-
site scripting).
• Security controls moving to application layer: Web pages
start to perform security checks.
• Access control for virtual organisations: e.g. federated
identity management.
• Security of end systems managed by the user.
•Disruptive Technologies
• Cheap and simple technologies that do not meet the
requirements of sophisticated users, but are adopted by a
wider public.
• When the new technology acquires advanced features, it takes
over the entire market.
• What happened to work stations?
• Problem for security: security features may not be required by
the applications the new technology is initially used for; when it
turns into a platform for sensitive applications, it becomes
difficult to re-integrate security.
•Summary

• Innovations (mouse, GUI, PC, WWW, worms, viruses) find

their way out of research labs into the mass market.
• Innovations are not always used as expected: email on the
Internet, SMS in GSM.
• Also the users are inventive!
• When new technology are used in innovative ways, old
security paradigms may no longer apply and the well
engineered ‘old’ security solutions become irrelevant.
• We can start all over again …
Part II
Foundations of Computer Security
•Outline of part 2

1. Some definitions
2. The fundamental dilemma of computer security
3. Data vs information
4. Principles of computer security
5. The layer below
6. The layer above
•Learning outcomes part II

a) Approach a definition of computer security introducing CIA

b) Explain the fundamental dilemma of computer security
c) Mention some general design decisions that have to me
made when constructing secure systems
d) Point out that security mechanisms have to rely on physical
or organizational protection to be effective
•Agenda

• Security strategies
• Prevention – detection – reaction
• Security objectives
• Confidentiality – integrity – availability
• Accountability – non-repudiation
• Fundamental Dilemma of Computer Security
• Principles of Computer Security
• The layer below
 Security strategies= Protecting Information Assets
i. Avoidance
ii. Prevention
iii.Detection
iv. Containment and
response
v. Recovery
vi. Improvement
Security strategies
1. Avoidance
• Improving security by to avoiding configurations that present
unnecessary opportunities for problems to occur. Example:
• IF users of systems on a particular network do not require direct access
to external networks,
• and IF inbound connections are forbidden,
• THEN there is no reason to connect the network to external networks in
the first place.
2. Prevention
• Implementation of measures and controls to minimize the
possibility of security problems occurring. Example
• It may be necessary to store different kinds of data on a common file
server.
• To prevent unauthorized access to each kind of data, access controls
should allow users to see only those kinds of data they have permission
to see.
Security strategies
3. Detection
 Despite all efforts to prevent unauthorized access to information
assets and resources, security incidents are bound to occur. It is
therefore necessary to implement measures to detect possible
information security problems when they occur. Example:
 It may be appropriate for you to deploy network traffic monitors to alert
you to unauthorized connection attempts to your networked systems.
4. Containment and response
 When information security incidents occur, you will have to work
quickly to contain the damage and respond to prevent further
unauthorized activity.
 Preparation and practice in handling security incidents is an essential part
of maintaining readiness to respond when incidents occur.
Security strategies
5. Recovery
 When system failures and security incidents occur, you will need to have
resources and data backups available to restore your data, systems,
networks, and security infrastructure to a “known-good” state.
 This means that preparation and ongoing effort must be applied in advance
to back up data and systems.
5. Improvement
 New threats to the security of information and information systems are
discovered every day. Intruders actively seek ways to infiltrate systems in
search of information and resources.
 It is necessary to engage in a continuous effort to sustain and improve the
security of the networked information systems under your administrative
control.
 As security incidents occur, lessons learned help to identify areas in need of
improvement.
 Staying up to date regarding newly discovered problems and the means to
mitigate them are essential elements of a continuous security improvement
process.
•Example 1 – Private Property
1. Prevention:
 locks at doors, window bars, walls round the property.
2. Detection:
 stolen items are missing, burglar alarms, closed circuit TV.
3. Reaction:
 call the police, replace stolen items, make an insurance
claim …
•Example 2 – E-Commerce
1. Prevention:
 encrypt your orders, rely on the merchant to perform
checks on the caller, don’t use the Internet (?) …
2. Detection:
 an unauthorized transaction appears on your credit card
statement.
3. Reaction:
 complain, ask for a new card number,
 Who will cover the fraudulent transaction? The card
holder, the merchant? The card issuer?
 Security Objectives CIAAA
1. Confidentiality:
 prevent unauthorised disclosure of information
2. Integrity:
 prevent unauthorised modification of information
3. Availability:
 prevent unauthorised withholding of information or
resources
4. Authenticity:
 “know whom you are talking to”
5. Accountability (non-repudiation):
 prove that an entity was involved in some event
 Confidentiality

Confidentiality

Secrecy
Privacy
=
=
Protection of data
Protection
belonging to an
of personal data
organisation.
More on Confidentiality- content or existence
of a document

Confidentiality

Content of a Existence
document of a document
 More on Confidentiality- traffic analysis in
communication system
 Un-linkability  Anonymity
 Two or more items of
 A subject is
interest (messages,
actions, events, users) anonymous if it
are unlikable if an cannot be identified
attacker cannot within a given
sufficiently distinguish anonymity set of
if they are related or subjects
not
•Privacy
• Protection of personal data (OECD Privacy Guidelines, EU
Data Privacy Directive 95/46/EC).
• “Put the user in control of their personal data and of
information about their activities.”
• Taken now more seriously by companies that want to be
‘trusted’ by their customers.
• Also: the right to be left alone, e.g. not to be bothered by
spam.
 Integrity
• Prevent unauthorised modification of information
(prevent unauthorised writing).
• Data Integrity - The state that exists when
computerized data is the same as that in the source
document and has not been exposed to accidental or
malicious alteration or destruction.
• Detection (and correction) of intentional and
accidental modifications of transmitted data.
•Integrity continued
• Clark & Wilson: no user of the system, even if authorized, may
be permitted to modify data items in such a way that assets
or accounting records of the company are lost or corrupted.
• In the most general sense: make sure that everything is as it is
supposed to be.
• (This is highly desirable but cannot be guaranteed by
mechanisms internal to the computer system.)
• Integrity is a prerequisite for many other security services;
operating systems security has a lot to do with integrity.
• Example : hacker trying to modify an OS access right table to
circumvent access controls.
Availability
The property of being accessible and usable upon demand by
an authorised entity.
Denial of Service (DoS): prevention of authorised access of
resources or the delaying of time-critical operations.
Maybe the most important aspect of computer security, but
few methods are around.
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) receives a lot of attention;
systems are now designed to be more resilient against these
attacks.
 •Denial of Service Attack (smurf)
• Attacker sends ICMP echo requests to a broadcast address,
with the victim’s address as the spoofed sender address.
• The echo request is distributed to all nodes in the range of the
broadcast address.
• Each node replies with an echo to the victim.
• The victim is flooded with many incoming messages.
• Note the amplification: the attacker sends one message, the
victim receives many.
 •Denial of Service Attack (smurf)

attacker
A

sends echo request to

broadcast address with A
victim as source

victim echo replies

A
to victim
•Accountability
• At the operating system level, audit logs record security
relevant events and the user identities associated with these
events.
• If an actual link between a user and a “user identity” can be
established, the user can be held accountable.
• In distributed systems, cryptographic non-repudiation
mechanisms can be used to achieve the same goal.
Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation services provide unforgeable evidence that a
specific action occurred.
1. Non-repudiation of origin: protects against a sender of data
denying that data was sent.
2. Non-repudiation of delivery: protects against a receiver of
data denying that data was received.
•Reliability & Safety

• Reliability and safety are related to security:

• Similar engineering methods,
• Similar efforts in standardisation,
• Possible requirement conflicts.
• Reliability addresses the consequences of accidental errors.
• Is security part of reliability or vice versa?
• Safety: measure of the absence of catastrophic influences
on the environment, in particular on human life.
•Security & Reliability
• On a PC, you are in control of the software components
sending inputs to each other.
• On the Internet, hostile parties provide input.
• To make software more reliable, it is tested against typical
usage patterns:
• “It does not matter how many bugs there are, it matters how often they
are triggered.”
• To make software more secure, it has to be tested against
‘untypical’ usage patterns (but there are typical attack
patterns).
•Dependability

• Proposal for a term that encompasses reliability,

safety, and security
• Dependability (IFIP WG 10.4):
I. The property of a computer system such that reliance
can justifiably be placed on the service it delivers.
II. The service delivered by a system is its behaviour as it is
perceived by its user(s); a user is another system
(physical, human) which interacts with the former.
•Distributed System Security
• Distributed systems: computers
connected by networks
• Communications (network) security:
addresses security of the
communications links
• Computer security: addresses security
of the end systems; today, this is the
difficult part.
• Application security: relies on both to
provide services securely to end users.
firewall
•What is computer security
What we do in computer security?
 We deal with the prevention and detection of
unauthorized actions by users fo a computer
systems.
Why we do it?

 Computer security is concerned with the

measures we take to deal with intentional actions
by parties behaving in some unwelcome fashion.
•Fundamental Dilemma of Computer Security

Security unaware users have specific security

requirements but no security expertise.

I. If you provide your customers with a standard

solution it might not meet their requirements.
II. If you want to tailor your solution to your
customers’ needs, they may be unable to tell you
what they require.
•DATA VS INFORMATION
 Data: physical
phenomena chosen by
convention to represent
certain aspects of our
conceptual and real
world.
 Information: The
meanings we assign to
data
 Controlling access to information
may be very difficult
 and need to be replaced by
controlling access to data.
 Possible problems:
 Covert channels:
response time or
memory usage may
signal information.
 Inference in statistical
databases: combine
statistical queries to
get information on
individual entries.
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•Principles of Computer Security
The Dimensions of Computer Security

Application
Software

User Resource
(subject) (object)

Hardware
Layer of a
computer system
where protection
Security policy mechanism is
implemented
1st Fundamental Design Decision
Where to focus security controls?

The focus may be on data – operations – users; e.g.

integrity requirements may refer to rules on

 Format and content of data items (internal consistency):

account balance in an accounts database is an integer.
 Operations that may be performed on a data item: credit,
debit, transfer, open account, check balance
 Users who are allowed to access a data item (authorised
access): account holder and bank clerk have access to
account.
 2nd Fundamental Design Decision:
Where to place security controls? (in which layer)
1. Users run application programs
2. Application programs may use the
services of a DBMS, a browser, etc.
Applications
3. These services run on top of an operating
system which provides file and memory
management and access control to Services (middleware)
resources such as printers and I/O
devices Operating system
4. The OS has a kernel which mediates
every access to the processor and to OS kernel
memory
5. The hardware ( the processor , memory) Hardware
physically stores and manipulates the
data held in the computer system.am
Another look at the layer problem
1. Visualize security mechanisms as concentric
protection rings, with hardware mechanisms in the
centre and application mechanisms at the outside.
2. Mechanisms towards the centre tend to be more
generic while mechanisms at the outside are more
likely to address individual user requirements.
3. The man-machine scale for security mechanisms
combines our first two design decisions.
 Security mechanism: Onion Model of Protection

applications

The Man-Machine services

Scale operating system
OS kernel
hardware

Specific complex Generic simple

focus on users focus on data

Man oriented Machine oriented

 •3rd Fundamental Design Decision
Complexity or Assurance?
Simplicity – and higher
assurance
 Simple generic mechanisms
may not match specific
security requirements
Security unaware users are in a no-win situation
53
Feature-rich security
environment?
 To choose the right
features from a rich menu,
you have to be a security
expert.
•Example: Security Evaluation

• Security evaluation checks whether products deliver

the security services promised.
• We have to state the
• function of the security system,
• required degree of assurance (trust) in its security.
• For high assurance, the security system has to be
examined in close detail.
• Obvious trade-off between complexity and assurance:
The higher an assurance level you aim for, the simpler
your system ought to be.
• Feature-rich security and high assurance do not match
easily.

54
 •4th Fundamental Design Decision
Centralized or decentralized control?

Centralized control Decentralized control

• Within the domain of a • A distributed solution may be
security policy, the same more efficient
controls should be • but you have to take added
enforced. care to guarantee that
different components
1. If a single entity is in charge enforce a consistent policy.
of security, then it is easy to
achieve uniformity
2. but this central entity may
become a performance
bottleneck.

55
 •Security perimeter
 Every protection mechanism
defines a security perimeter
(security boundary).
 The parts of the system that can
malfunction without compromising
the mechanism lie outside the
perimeter.
 The parts of the system that can
disable the mechanism lie within
the perimeter.
 Note: Attacks from insiders are a
major concern in security
considerations.
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•Exercise
• Identify
suitable security perimeters for
analysing personal computer (PC) security.
• Consider the room the PC is placed in,
• the PC itself,

• or some security module within the PC when

investigating security perimeters.

a. Is the PC in a protected room, a room shared with colleagues, a room in a

public place
b. What are the options for input? Keyboard, data carrier (CD, USB stick,
floppy), Internet?
c. Can users take the PC home or open it?

57
5th Fundamental Design Decision
Blocking Access to the Layer Below

 Attackers try to bypass protection mechanisms.

 There is an immediate and important corollary
to the second design decision:
 How do you stop an attacker from getting
access to a layer below your protection
mechanism?

58
Examples of bypassing control mechanisms from
the layer below

You can change programs, files that

If you gain
contain control data for security
system
mechanisms in the service and
privileges in
applications layers
OS

If you have direct

access to the  You can manipulate the raw
physical memory data
devices  You bypass the logical
controls of the operating
system
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•Access to the Layer Below

Controlled access

Security perimeter

Physical access control and administrative measures

60
•The Layer Below – Examples
1. Recovery tools (ex: Norton)
• If the logical organization of memory is destroyed?
• Restore data by reading memory directly and then restoring
the file structure.
• Such a tool can be used to circumvent logical access control as
it does not care for the logical memory structure.
2. Unix treats I/O devices and physical memory devices
like files.
• If access permissions are defined badly, e.g.
• if read access is given to a disk, an attacker can read the disk
contents and reconstruct read protected files.

61
•More examples – Storage risk
3. Object reuse: (release of memory)
 In single processor systems, when a new process is activated it
gets access to memory positions used by the previous process.
 Avoid storage residues, i.e. data left behind in the memory area
allocated to the new process.
4. Backup:
 Whoever has access to a backup tape has access to all the data
on it.
 Logical access control is of no help and backup tapes have to be
locked away safely to protect the data.
5. Core dumps:
 same story again

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•The Layer Above
• It is neither necessary nor sufficient to have a secure
infrastructure, be it an operating system or a communications
network, to secure an application.
• Security services provided by the infrastructure may be
irrelevant for the application.
• Infrastructure cannot defend against attacks from the layer
above.
• Fundamental Fallacy of Computer Security: Don’t believe
that you must secure the infrastructure to protect your
applications.
•Summary
• Security terminology is ambiguous with many overloaded
terms.
• Distributed systems security builds on computer security and
communications security.
• Two major challenges in computer security, are:
I. the design of access control systems that fit the requirements of
the Internet
II. and the design of secure software.
• In security, understanding the problem is more difficult than
finding the solution.
References
Gollmann, 3rd Edition , 2011, Computer
• Dieter,
Security, John Wiley and Sons