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John J.

Mearsheimer
A Strategic Misstep:
The Maritime Strategy and
Deterrence in Europe.
Useful definitions
• “Deterrence stability”: the stability caused by your
ability to threaten your adversary with a
formidable military posture so that he recognizes
that he cannot use force to upset the status quo.
• “Crisis stability”: it is applied in cases where
neither side is firmly committed to aggression and
is a function of the structure of the rival deterrent
postures. It depends of each side’s perceptions of
the other’s aggressiveness, the degree of military
advantage accruing to the side striking first and
the tendency of peacetime military operation to
activate the opponent’s ROE.
What NATO was afraid of;
• Soviet Union’s attempt to sever the Atlantic
SLOC by using SSN.
• Early deployment of Soviet SSBN.
• Soviet blitzkrieg in the Central Front (Europe)

How can the Navy solve these problems;

• Direct Naval Impact.


• Horizontal Escalation.
• Sea Control.
• Counterforce Coercion.
Area of Operations
Direct Naval Impact Strategy
• US Navy strike Soviet targets and lessen
Soviet prospects of winning a conventional
war in Europe.
• The requirements are powerful Navy with
substantial carrier battle group component
and a truly robust amphibious capability.
• Critical time constrains are involved.
• There are three principal scenarios for
using the Navy.
1st Scenario
• A major landing operation at the coast of either the
Baltic or Black Sea.
Problems
• The element of tactical surprise is missing.
• It is difficult to gain air and sea control of the
landing area.
• US has a limited amphibious lift capability.
• Even if you overcome all of the above, it is difficult
to maintain lines of communication with your forces.
2nd Scenario
• Participation of the Navy’s carrier-based aircraft into
the air war on the Central front.
Problems
• It’s not in NATO plans.
• It is very expensive.
3rd Scenario
• Naval offensive against the Kola Peninsula would
force the Soviets to postpone a blitzkrieg operation in
Europe because they will have to transfer much
needed air units from Europe to the Kola Peninsula.
Problems
• Lack of credibility. It is not clear that the Navy
would achieve a major success.
• Soviets can send air units not involved with
operations at the Central front.
• Soviets’ time frame for executing a successful
blitzkrieg would be short enough that events on the
Northern Flank would not upset it in any way.
• Central Europe is where a major conventional war
would be settled.
Horizontal Escalation Strategy
• Similar to the “Direct Naval Impact Strategy” this
strategy does little to enhance deterrence. The most
difficult part is to find an appropriate target.
Problems
• The Soviets could afford to absorb a hit in the far
East while they were rolling up NATO’s forces in
Central Europe.
• Again it is not clear that the Navy could inflict a
significant defeat on Soviet forces.
• There is no evidence that NATO could improve the
force ratio in Europe by pursuing this strategy.
Conclusions
Advocates of both strategies tend towards a Mahanian
view of military power. They believe that control of
the sea is the key ingredient for great power status.
However this is not an accurate assessment of the
present superpower rivalry. The only suitable military
lever that can bring pressure against a continental
power (Soviet Union) is a strong army supported by
tactical air forces. The neo – Mahanian threats of
horizontal escalation and direct military impact simply
do not provide a satisfactory posture for deterring a
formidable land power like the Soviet Union.
Sea control Strategy
• Defensive Sea Control • Offensive Sea Control
1. Sealing off the Soviet 1. “Rollback campaign”.
SSN with a barrier in US SSN would destroy
GIN gap. Soviet SSN in the
2. Open ocean ASW below Norwegian and
the GIN gap iot Barents Sea.
neutralize SSN that 2. Carrier battle groups
penetrate the barrier. launch air strikes and
3. Neutralize “Backfire” cruise missiles strikes
threat with aircraft against Kola Peninsula
stationed in UK, Iceland, iot eliminate the air
Norway, Greenland. threat to NATO ‘s
SLOCs.
Why offensive sea control isn’t an
appropriate deterrent strategy;
• Even a 600 ship Navy would have difficulties in
rolling back the Soviets’ Northern Fleet and then
launching attacks against the Kola Peninsula.
• Soviets had an enormous array of assets at the Kola
Peninsula besides the Northern Fleet.
• US Navy didn’t have adequate number of attacking
aircraft and carriers for an efficient attack.
• Impossible to inflict a knock out blow against the
Soviet Air Forces.
• US Navy can’t fight a protracted air war on NATO’s
Northern flank.
• The threat of nuclear escalation.
• Soviet’s SSNs primary mission is to protect
SSBNs and not to attack NATO’s SLOCs.

However if Soviet Union attacks NATO’s


SLOCs the defensive sea control strategy is
still the most appropriate. Why;;;
• Soviet SSNs would also confront the not-
insignificant Navies of US allies.
• NATO would have turned the GIN gap into a
strong defensive barrier.
• NATO’s dependence on reinforcements by sea in
the early stage of a conflict wouldn’t be great.
• Much easier to destroy Backfires in the area
around GIN gap.
• Variety of ASW assets against Soviet SSNs at the
GIN gap.

Conclusion
The Soviets could not be confident of winning the
SLOC war, much less winning it in a reasonably
short period of time, if NATO pursued a defensive
sea control posture.
Counterforce coercion
Use of US SSNs to eliminate significant numbers of
Soviet SSBNs. This strategy requires a large scale
insertion operation as well as a rollback operation. It
will enhance deterrence in two ways:
• Sink enough SSBNs to shift the strategic balance
against the Soviets.
• Produce deterrence simply by generating the risk of
nuclear war, even if it didn’t necessarily change the
strategic balance.
Problems
• Risky strategy because of the threat of nuclear
escalation.
Mearsheimer’s view
This strategy could be quite destabilizing in a crisis
because it provides very little deterrence stability and
promotes crisis instability.
Problems
• If US SSNs position themselves into the Barents
Sea, Soviets would certainly make worst case
assumptions about US intentions.
• Soviet Union will deploy SSNs and a deadly game of
cat and mouse would ensue with unpredicted results.
• Also it is possible that some US SSNs would be lost
because of mines forcing the US to respond.
• An American anti-SSBN campaign would generate
risk too early and with less credibility.
Mearsheimer’s Final conclusions
• A defensive sea control strategy would satisfy
NATO’s needs in protecting the SLOCs.
• The force structure demands of defensive sea
control are more modest than those of offensive sea
control.
• More resources for the ground and air forces on the
Central Front, which represent the core of NATO’s
deterrent.
• By building a large Navy and not increasing the
ground and air forces in Europe, Reagan
administration missed an excellent opportunity to
improve NATO ‘s deterrent posture.
My own conclusions
• I am sure that Mearsheimer wasn’t voting for
Reagan.
• He is a huge fun of the Navy.
• As a neutral reader I believe that his arguments are
very convincing.
• I am happy that we didn’t have the chance to test
his arguments.
Questions;;;;

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