Title and abstract before Friday, March 11, 2011 at 2:46 p.m.

Japan time:

Used Nuclear Fuel: From Liability to Benefit

Raymond L. Orbach Energy Institute, The University of Texas at Austin orbach@energy.utexas.edu www.energy.utexas.edu
Nuclear power has proven safe and reliable, with operating efficiencies in the U.S. exceeding 90%. As such, it ideally provides a carbon-free source of electricity (with about a 10% penalty arising from the CO2 released from construction and the fuel cycle). However, used fuel from nuclear reactors is highly toxic and presents a challenge for permanent disposal -- both from a technical perspective and from a policy perspective. The half-life of the bad actors is relatively short (of the order of decades) while the very long lived isotopes are relatively benign. At present, spent fuel is stored on-site, in cooling ponds. Once the used fuel pools are full, the fuel is moved to dry cask storage on site. Though the local storage is capable of handling used fuel safely and securely for several decades, the law requires the DOE to assume responsibility for the used fuel and remove it from reactor sites. Under this law, the nuclear industry pays a tithe that is to support sequestration of usedfuel (but not research). However, there is currently no national policy in place to deal with the permanent disposal of nuclear fuel. This administration is opposed to underground storage at Yucca Mountain. There is no national policy for interim storage removal of spent fuel from reactor sites and storage at a central location. And there is no national policy for liberating the energy contained in used fuel through recycling (separating out the fissionable components for subsequent use as a nuclear fuel). Therefore, a Blue Ribbon Commission has been formed to consider alternatives, but will not report until 2012. This paper will examine alternatives for used fuel disposition, their drawbacks (e.g. proliferation issues arising from recycling), and their benefits. For the recycle options emerge as viable technologies, the nuclear chemistry program in the U.S. needs to be revitalized; research is required to develop cost effective methods for treating spent fuel, with attention to policy issues as well as technical issues.

Title and abstract after Friday, March 11, 2011 at 2:46 p.m. Japan time:

Anatomy of a (partial) meltdown: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants

Raymond L. Orbach Energy Institute, The University of Texas at Austin orbach@energy.utexas.edu www.energy.utexas.edu

Chronology of Events (from CNN):

Friday, March 11, 2011: 2.46 p.m. (0.46 a.m. ET/5.46 a.m. GMT): A magnitude 9.0 earthquake strikes an area 370 kilometers (230 miles) northeast of Tokyo, Japan, at a depth of 24.5 kilometers. The offshore quake, the fifth largest worldwide since records began, sparks a major tsunami warning across the Pacific. Within an hour a wall of water up to 9 meters (30 feet) high hits the Japanese coast, sweeping away towns and villages in its path.
2

Event Initiation (from NEXTera ENERGY, Duane Arnold)

The Fukushima nuclear facilities were damaged in a magnitude 8.9 earthquake on March 11 (Japan time), centered offshore of the Sendai region, which contains the capital Tokyo.
Plant designed for magnitude 8.2 earthquake. An 8.9 magnitude quake is 7 times in greater in magnitude.

Serious secondary effects followed including a significant tsunami, significant aftershocks and a major fire at a fossil fuel installation.

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station (from NEXTera ENERGY, Duane Arnold)

Six BWR Mark I units at the Fukushima Nuclear Station:

Unit 1: 439 MWe BWR, 1971 (unit was in operation prior to event) Unit 2: 760 MWe BWR, 1974 (unit was in operation prior to event) Unit 3: 760 MWe BWR, 1976 (unit was in operation prior to event) Unit 4: 760 MWe BWR, 1978 (unit was in outage prior to event) Unit 5: 760 MWe BWR, 1978 (unit was in outage prior to event) Unit 6: 1067 MWe BWR, 1979 (unit was in outage prior to event)

Unit 1

Timing of Reactor Events (D.V. Rao and Patrick McClure)

Earthquake Begins Reactor shuts down Off-grid, diesels provide power Reactor cooled by emergency systems Tsunami fails diesel generators Battery powers control of steam-driven Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) and automatic depressurization Battery power exhausted Report of suppression pool (wet well) becoming saturated Containment pressure 0.6 MPa (0.4 MPa normal) Steam vented from reactor to Refueling Bay Water level drops to top of active fuel Core oxidation occurs, releasing hydrogen Hydrogen Explosion/Deflagration Fri. 2:46 PM JST Fri. 2:48 PM JST Seconds later After diesels start Fri. ~3:45 PM JST After diesels fail Sat. ~12:00 AM JST Sat. ~2:00 AM JST Sat. ~2:00 AM JST Sat. 5:30 AM JST Sat. 3:36 PM JST

Seawater injection begins

Slide 6

Sun 8:20 PM JST

Chronology of Events (cont.):

Friday, March 11 8.15 p.m.: The Japanese government declares an emergency at Fukushima Daiichi power plant. 10.30 p.m.: Authorities reveal the cooling system at the plant is not working, and admit they are "bracing for the worst." Saturday, March 12 2.06 a.m.: Radiation levels in the No.1 reactor at Fukushima are reported to be rising. 3.24 a.m.: Japanese trade minister Banri Kaieda warns that a small radiation leak could occur at the plant. 6.45 a.m.: TEPCO says radioactive substances may have leaked at Fukushima. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency says radiation near the plant's main gate is more than eight times the normal level. 4.19 p.m.: Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Agency reveals a small amount of radioactive cesium has escaped from the power plant, possibly caused by a fuel rod melting. EXPLOSION: 6.22 p.m.: A hydrogen explosion at Fukushima's reactor No.3 blows the roof off the containment structure around the No.1 reactor and injures four people -- two plant workers and two subcontractors. 8.18 p.m.: Residents living within 20 kilometers of the plant are told to evacuate the area. Some 200,000 people leave. 8.54 p.m.: Authorities insist no harmful gases were emitted as a result of the explosion at the Fukushima plant, blaming the blast on "water vapor that was part of the cooling process." 10.35 p.m.: Radiation levels around the plant fall as officials prepare to flood the containment structure around the reactor with sea water to cool it. Meanwhile, authorities prepare to distribute iodide tablets to residents near the damaged nuclear plant to prevent radiation poisoning.
7

Chronology of Events (cont.):

Sunday, March 13 3.20 a.m.: Three people randomly selected from a group of 90 test positive for radiation exposure in Fukushima prefecture. 5.37 a.m.: Japanese authorities say Saturday's explosion at the Fukushima Daiichi plant occurred outside the primary containment vessel, adding that the vessel's integrity has not been compromised. 4.46 p.m.: Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Endo warns of the possibility that a second explosion could happen at the No.3 reactor. Monday, March 14 EXPLOSION: 11 a.m.: Hydrogen explosion at the No.3 reactor damages the cooling system at the No.2 reactor and injures 11 people, including employees, subcontractors and four civil defense workers. A wall at the plant collapses as a result of the blast, but officials say the containment vessel surrounding the reactor remains intact. Authorities begin pumping a mixture of sea water and boron into the No.2 reactor to cool its nuclear fuel rods. Those residents living within 20 kilometers of the plant who have so far ignored evacuation orders are warned to stay indoors. Up to 2.7 meters of the No.2 reactor's control rods are left uncovered because the pump which keeps them cool has run low on fuel after being left unattended. It causes them to heat up generating radioactive steam. Tuesday, March 15 EXPLOSION: 6 a.m.: An "explosive impact" rocks the No.2 reactor -- the third blast at the plant in four days -- and damages its suppression pool. 7 a.m.: The U.S. Navy begins repositioning ships and planes after detecting low-level "airborne radioactivity" in the region. Three people on the U.S.S. Ronald Regan earlier tested positive for low levels of radiation. 8.30 a.m.: Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano says he cannot rule out the possibility of a meltdown at all three of the plant's damaged reactors. He says radiation levels at the plant have increased to "levels that can impact human health", and warns anyone living within 20 and 30 kilometers of the plant to remain indoors. Almost all of the plant's staff, about 800 people, are evacuated from the site, with just 50 remaining to carry out emergency operations.
8

Chronology of Events (cont.):

FIRE: 8.54 am: Fire breaks out in a cooling pond used for nuclear fuel at the No.4 reactor -- which had been shut down before Friday's quake. Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan warns that "there is still a very high risk of further radioactive material coming out," but urges the public to remain calm. The government imposes a no-fly zone within a 30-kilometer radius of the plant. 11 a.m.: The fire in No.4 reactor is reported to have been extinguished. The International Atomic Energy Agency reveals that radiation levels at the plant have been recorded at 167 times the average annual dose of radiation, but that level is expected to drop quickly. 11.10 p.m.: The IAEA reports that Monday's blast at reactor No.2 "may have affected the integrity of its primary containment vessel." 11.45 p.m.: TEPCO says it plans to use helicopters to pour water onto reactor No.4 in order to cool the nuclear fuel rods. Wednesday, March 16 FIRE: 7 a.m.: The second fire in two days is discovered in the building of the No. 4 reactor at Fukushima Daiichi. This one is in the northeastern corner of the building, an official with TEPCO says. Thursday, March 17 4.35 a.m.: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission recommends that U.S. residents within 80 kilometers of the Fukushima reactors evacuate the area. 5.00 a.m.: Gregory Jaczko, head of the NRC, tells U.S. Congress spent fuel rods in the No. 4 reactor have been exposed because there "is no water in the spent fuel pool," resulting in the emission of "extremely high" levels of radiation. Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa says a decision has been taken to address the crisis from the air and the ground -- despite concerns about exposing workers to radiation -- with efforts to cool down the No.3 reactor the top priority. "We could not delay the mission any further, therefore we decided to execute it," Kitazawa said. 9.48 a.m.: Helicopters operated by Japan's Self-Defense Forces begin dumping tonnes of seawater scooped from the Pacific Ocean on to the No.3 and No.4 reactors to try to reduce overheating. But hours later, TEPCO tells Japan's Kyodo News the operation does not appear to have lowered radiation levels in the area. 10.15 a.m.: The IAEA says two people are missing at Fukushima Daiichi, and another has suffered significant exposure to radioactive material. Based on information supplied by Japanese authorities, it says two TEPCO workers have been injured, along with two subcontractors, and that at least 20 people have fallen ill due to possible radiation contamination.

Chronology of Events (cont.):

12.00 p.m.: TEPCO officials deny claims the spent fuel pool has run dry. "We have been able to confirm that there is water in the spent nuclear fuel pool," a Tokyo Electric spokesman said. "But we do not know how much water." 3.00 p.m.: Australia urges its citizens living within 80 kilometers of the Fukushima plant to evacuate. 7.30 p.m.: Japanese Defense Ministry uses five water cannon trucks to shoot water into reactor No.3 in another effort to prevent it overheating. The operation ends forty minutes later. Friday, March 18 9.30 a.m.: Japan's nuclear and industrial safety agency raises the crisis level from four to five, putting it on a par with the 1979 nuclear incident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania. The International Nuclear Events Scale says a level five incident means there is a likelihood of a release of radioactive material, several deaths from radiation and severe damage to the reactor core. Saturday, March 19 9.00 a.m.: As searches for survivors continued, police in Japan said more than 7,100 people had died since the monster earthquake and ensuing tsunami struck. On Saturday morning 7,197 people were confirmed dead, according to Japan's National Police Agency. Another 10,905 people were missing and 2,611 were injured, the agency said. 1.00 p.m.: Efforts accelerated Saturday to restore power to nuclear reactors' cooling systems at the stricken Fukushima Daiichi plant. Officials said workers hope to fully restore power by day's end Saturday to plant's Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6 reactors, and to get power up and running Sunday for the Nos. 3 and 4 reactors. 7.27 p.m.: Japan's National Police Agency says 7,348 people are now confirmed dead and 10,947 are missing. The agency said 2,603 people have been injured.

10

Boiling Water Reactor

Radiation Levels
Highest recorded radiation level at the Fukushima Daiichi site was 155.7 millirem. Radiation levels were subsequently reduced to 4.4 millirem after the after the containment was flooded. The NRC s radiation dose limit for the public is 100 millirem per year.

How much is a millirem

Eating one banana: 0.01 millirem Dental radiography: 0.5 millirem Average dose to people living within 16 km of Three Mile Island accident: 8.0 millirem; maximum dose: 100 millirem Mammogram: 300 millirem Brain CT scan: 80 500 millirem Chest CT scan: 600 1800 millirem Gastrointestinal series X-ray investigation:1.4 rems Threshold from DOE and French Academies studies:10 rems
15

Summary Mark I Notes

Twenty-three reactors in the United States utilizing Mark I containments Available data suggest similarities exist in the design and operation of Japanese and U.S. Mark I containments Immediate improvements:
Passive cooling system for spent fuel storage pools (air cooled heat exchangers) Primary containment venting system that minimizes hydrogen combustion risk (design issues-distributive outlet, hardened vents; Hydrogen mitigation in the secondary containment building) In-vessel retention of corium (lava-like molten mixture of portions of a nuclear reactor, formed during a nuclear meltdown) Core catcher to mitigate ex-vessel core relocation, preventing coriumconcrete interactions (heat-absorbing, non-gas emitting, sacrificial materials, external natural circulation-cooled externally)
16

What is next?

17

Gen 3+ Systems: GE Hitachi ESBWR (Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor)

Reduced core height, chimney above the core, tall, wide down corner (annulus for feed water to flow back down), promoting natural circulation, eliminating need for recirculation pumps 72 hours passive performance with no pumps and outside intervention under accident scenario corium (lava-like molten mixture of portions of a nuclear reactor, formed during a nuclear meltdown) retention/cooling system 25 percent of pumps, valves, and motors eliminated from previous nuclear island designs Incorporation of features used in operationally proven BWRs, including isolation condensers, natural circulation and debris-resistant fuel Broad seismic design envelope
18

19

Gen 3+ Systems: Westinghouse AP1000

Passive core cooling system
Safety injection and reactor coolant Passive residual heat removal

Containment isolation
Reduction of normally open penetrations reduced by 50 percent Penetrations are normally closed No recirculation of irradiated water outside of containment Steel containment is high integrity steel pressure vessel, rather than a concrete vessel

Passive containment cooling system Control room habitability (pressurization, ventilation, and climate control system) for 72 hour period

20

21

General Atomics High Temperature Gas Reactor

22

Ceramic Fuel Particle and Graphite Block Feature: Containment are Basic Unit of Reactor Safety TRISO barrier at the
Fuel Kernel
Provides fission energy Controls oxygen potential

Buffer layer (porous carbon layer)

Provides void volume for gaseous fission products and CO Accommodates kernel swelling Attenuates fission recoils

Inner Pyrocarbon (IPyC)

Protects kernel from Cl attack during SiC layer deposition Reduces tensile stress in SiC Retains gaseous fission products

Silicon Carbide (SiC)

855 Qm

~1000 Qm

Primary load bearing member Retains gaseous and metallic fission products

Outer Pyrocarbon (OPyC)

Reduces tensile stress in SiC Retains gaseous fission products Protects SiC from chemical attack by coolant impurities

HTGR: Required Safety Functions Not Reliant on Long-Term Power

24

Summary and Conclusions

There are lessons to be learned from the (partial) meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants for Mark I BWR (Boiling Water Reactors) Passive cooling systems for spent fuel storage pools Primary containment venting system that minimizes hydrogen combustion risk In-vessel retention of corium (lava-like molten mixture of portions of a nuclear reactor core, formed during a nuclear meltdown) Moving spent fuel away from reactor sites (11,125 assemblies stored at Daiichi, ~ 4 times the in-core inventory) Need for risk informed approach to response strategies Quest for perfect outcome (saving the reactors, avoiding venting of steam with radioactive noble gases/entrained fission products ) may have created more negative consequences Earlier start could have reduced fuel damage and/or prevented the hydrogen explosions initiated by high temperature cladding/steam interaction
25